

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Cecil Fitzgerald Jamison, # 46544,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Douglas Strickler, Chief Public Defender;

Lane Danielson, Public Defender; and

Camille Everhart, Public Defender,

Defendants.

) C/A No. 9:07-3853-RBH-GCK

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Report and Recommendation

RECEIVED
USDC, CHARLESTON, SC
2007 DEC -5 P 4: 09


This is a civil action filed *pro se* by a county detainee.¹ Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County, South Carolina. He alleges that he has been held there pending trial for over one year, and he claims that the delay in bringing him to trial sooner is the fault of the Defendants. Defendants are public defenders who have been assigned to represent Plaintiff in his pending criminal case. Plaintiff claims that he is not receiving competent legal counsel from Defendants and that, as a result, Defendants are violating his due-process rights. He seeks both injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violations alleged.

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's *pro se* Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,

¹ Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such *pro se* cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).


Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of N. Y.*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

 In order to state a claim for damages or other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,² an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he or she was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person”

² Plaintiff's Complaint is being considered under this Court's federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. *Jennings v. Davis*, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their *federally guaranteed* rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. *McKnight v. Rees*, 88 F.3d 417(6th Cir. 1996)(emphasis added).

acting "under color of state law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Monroe v. Page*, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1230 (2002). Defendants, all of whom are public defender attorneys, have not acted under color of state law, and, as a result, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a viable § 1983 claim against any one of them.

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant(s) deprived him or her of a federal right, and (2) did so under color of state law. See *Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). It is well settled that a criminal defense attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which, as stated above, is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See *Deas v. Potts*, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976)(private attorney); *Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980)(court-appointed attorney); *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 (1981)(public defender); see also *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982)("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement . . . also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").

 The essence of Plaintiff's complaint is a legal malpractice claim. He claims that Defendants have neglected his case and caused him to suffer serious harm as a result. Negligence and legal malpractice are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under any other federal law that would provide this Court with federal question jurisdiction. See *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 328-336 & n. 3 (1986); *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 345-348 (1986); *Ruefly v. Landon*, 825 F.2d 792, 793-794 (4th Cir. 1987); *Pink v. Lester*, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995)(applying *Daniels v. Williams* and *Ruefly v. Landon*: "The district court properly held that *Daniels* bars an action under § 1983 for negligent conduct[.]"). Secondly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the *Bivens* doctrine do not impose liability


for violations of duties of care arising under state law. *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989).

Negligence and legal malpractice are causes of action under South Carolina law. *See, e.g., Mitchell v. Holler*, 311 S.C. 406, 429 S.E.2d 793 (1993); *Yarborough v. Rogers*, 306 S.C. 260, 411 S.E.2d 424 (1991); *see also* S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530; 15-3-535 (Supp. 2003)(state statute of limitations on negligence/malpractice actions); *Epstein v. Brown*, 363 S.C. 372, 610 S.E.2d 816 (2005). A civil action for negligence and legal malpractice would be cognizable in this Court under the diversity statute, if that statute's requirements are satisfied. *See Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin*, 804 F. Supp. 784, 788-91 (D.S.C. 1992). However, since it is clear that Plaintiff and all Defendants are South Carolina residents, there is no diversity of citizenship evident in this case. *M & I Heat Transfer Prods, Ltd. v. Willke*, 131 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260 (D. Mass. 2001) (complete diversity rule requires that no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants).

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); *Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d at 74; *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

December 4, 2007
Charleston, South Carolina


George C. Kosko
United States Magistrate Judge

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
P.O. Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).